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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD J. LAWRENCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
J. RAY WARD, LEWIS SELLENEIT, 
dba United Auto Sales, and UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
JOHN W. HARD~IAN, et al., 
Third Party Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
SANDY CITY BANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Civil No. 
8461 
This appeal is occasioned by the refusal of the Trial 
Court to enter judgment in favor of the appellant and 
against the Bonding Company. It gave the appellant 
judgment .against J. Ray Ward and Lewis Selleneit 
individually but denied the appellant the benefit of their 
statutory bonds. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by Clifford J. Lawrence 
to establish liability against the defendants J. Ray Ward 
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and Lewis Selleneit, dba United Auto Sales, and against 
the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, upon 
the statutory bonds furnished by the defendant U. S. F. 
& G. Co. The Third Party Plaintiffs, including Sandy 
City Bank, also asserted liability against the individual 
defendants and against the U. S. F. & G. Co. on the 
statutory bo~ds it had issued. 
Prior to the 1st day of June 1954 the defendant 
Selleneit had taken over a used car lot at 650 South 
Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 200 and 213). 
The U.S. F. & G. Co. had, on August 10, 1953, furnished 
to Mr. Selleneit a statutory bond in the sum of $1000.00 
as a Used :Motor Vehicle Salesman (Ex. 2-D). In the 
early part of June, 1954 the defendants Selleneit and 
J. Ray Ward agreed that J. Ray Ward would become 
associated with Selleneit in the used car lot (R. 202) and 
would provide capital for the business (R. 201). Because 
Selleneit was in default in the payment of sales taxes 
owing the State of Utah (R. 203) it was arranged that 
the necessary statutory Automobile Dealer's Bond in the 
sum of $5000.00 would be issued in the name of the de-
fendant J. Ray \Vard, which was done on June 10, 1954 
(Ex. 4-D, R. 204). During June, July and August, 1954 
Ward and Selleneit continued active in the used car busi-
ness, but in August they had exhausted their credit and 
the business failed ( R. 334). 
At the time \V ard becmne associated in the business 
the automobile of plaintiff Clifford J. Lawrence had 
been placed on the used car lot on consign1nent for s.ale. 
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It was sold by United Auto Sales (R. 388) and the pro-
ceeds of the sale were never paid to Lawrence (R. 390; 
Pre-trial Order p. 4 R. 140). Lawrence was given judg-
men against Ward and Selleneit and the U.S. F. & G. Co. 
for the sale price of the car and interest (R. 174). 
The Third Party Plaintiffs John \V. Hardman and 
Van Hardman agreed to purchase a Pontiac auto from 
United Auto Sales and turned in a car for a credit of 
$200.00 on the purchase price (R. 244; p. 5 Pre-Trial 
Order R. 141). The United Auto Sales could not deliver 
title to the Pontiac and the Hardmans were required to 
return it to United Auto Sales (R. 216 and 261). The 
trade-in car could not be returned and the Hardmans were 
given judgment against Ward and Selleneit and against 
U. S. F. & G. Co. for the sum of $210.00, the value of the 
trade-in car, and interest (R. 174). 
In August 1954 Dr. Lawrence Currier paid United 
Auto Sales a deposit of $100.00 cash on a new Ford car. 
Delivery of the car could not be made and the deposit 
was not refunded (R. 141). Currier was given judgment 
against Ward and Selleneit and against U. S. F. & G. 
Co. for the sum of $100.00 .and interest ( R. 17 4-5). 
Third Party Plaintiff Earl J. Bellows, in June 1954, 
agreed to purchase a Pontiac car for $1875.00 (R. 267). 
He paid $650.00 cash and traded in a 1941 Chevrolet 
coupe for an additional credit of $100.00 (R. 268-70). 
He· signed a Promissory Note to Continental National 
Bank for the balance (R. 271). The title to the Pontiac 
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was held by Utah Savings & Trust Company for a balance 
of 390.00, which amount Bellows had to pay in order to 
get title to the automobile (R. 272). The Court awarded 
judgment in favor of Bellows against Ward and Selleneit 
and U. S. F. & G. Co. for the sum of $300.00 and interest 
(R. 175). 
Third Party Plaintiff Paul C. Lyon, Jr. agreed to 
purchase from United Auto Sales an automobile in Aug-
ust 1954. He paid in cash $1000.00. The .automobile was 
never delivered (R. 141) and the Court awarded judg-
ment against Ward and against U. S. F. & G. Co. for 
the sum of $1000.00 and interest (R.175). 
Third Party Plaintiff Eugene Dalton, on August 
9, 1954, agreed to purchase from United Auto Sales a 
1954 Chevrolet .and paid $100.00 down (R. 141) and 
signed a Note and Chattel Mortgage to Sandy City Bank 
for the balance (Ex. 11-D and Ex. 13-D). United Auto 
Sales failed to deliver title to the automobile or to re-
fund the $100.00 ( R. 1-1-1) and Dalton was given judg-
ment against the defendant J. Ray \Yard and U. S. F. & 
G. Co. for $100.00 and interest (R. 141). In this trans-
action United Auto Sales collected the proceeds of the 
Note and Mortgage in the sun1 of $1282.75 upon a forged 
endorsement of the signature of Dalton (Ex. D-12) and 
that amount is part of the claim of Sandy City B.ank 
hereinafter more fully set forth. 
Third Party Plaintiff A. Richard Brown .had re-
,\ 
ceived a check of United Auto Sales in the sun1 of 
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$387.00 which had been dishonored by the Bank (R. 141, 
377). Brown surrendered the $387.00 check and received 
from United Auto Sales an $800.00 check payable to 
Thomas J. Richards and United Auto Sales and paid 
the difference. The endorsement of Richards on the 
$800.00 check was a forgery (R. 141, 377; Ex. 29-D). 
The Court gave Brown judgment against Ward and Sel-
leneit and U. S. F. & G. Co. for $800.00 and interest 
(R. 175). 
On June 26, 1954 Third Party Plaintiff R. E. Hardy 
tra;ded in a 1951 l\1ercury automobile on a 1954 model 
Chevrolet automobile (R. 534, 141). He executed a 
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage on the Chevrolet 
for the sum of $1873.00 (Exs. 22-D and 23-D), that 
being the balance of the purchase price and finance costs. 
United Auto Sales could not deliver title to the Chevrolet 
and Hardy was given judgment against Ward and Sel-
lenit and U. S. F. & G. Co. for the sum of $248.00, that 
being the value of the trade-in car, and interest (R. 176). 
In this transaction a check for $1650.00, being the balance 
owing United Auto Sales on the Chevrolet, issued by 
\Vinder Insurance Agency and payable to Ralph E. 
Hardy and United Auto Sales, was delivered to United 
Auto Sales (Ex. 21-D) and United Auto Sales collected 
the proceeds of that check without obtaining the endorse~ 
ment of Ralph E. Hardy. The sum of $1650. is a part 
of the claim of Sandy City Bank as hereinafter set forth. 
Third Party Plaintiff Ray Whetman agreed to pur-
chase a 1953 Hudson from United Auto Sales and paid 
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$850.00 (R. 142, 282; Ex. 19-D). Title could not be de-
livered because the automobile was owned by the 
Amorilla Auction Company (R. 283). In order to obtain 
title Whetman paid Amorilla Auction Company $970.00 
(Ex. 20-D; R. 284). He was paid $350.00 by Ward, 
leaving a balance of $500.00, for which he was given judg-
ment against Ward, Selleneit and U. S. F. & G. Co. with 
interest. 
Third Party Plaintiff and appellant Sandy City 
Bank acted as finance company in respect to many sales 
of the United Auto Sales. The Bank's method of financ-
ing sales of cars by United Auto Sales was as follows: 
Either J. Ray Ward, the bonded dealer, or Lewis W. 
Selleneit, the bonded salesman, would report credit sales 
of automobiles to Mr. Fotheringham of the Winder In-
surance Agency and would supply him with a descrip-
tion of the car, the terms of sale, and the identity of the 
purchaser. Fotheringham would relay such information 
to Sandy City Bank and it would review the transaction, 
investigate the credit of the purchaser, and notify 
Fotheringham whether or not it would finance the pur-
chase of the automobile. Fotheringhan1, in turn, would 
so notify the United Auto Sales, whereupon Fothering-
harn would obtain frmn the purchaser his Promissory 
Note p.ayable to Sandy City Bank for the unpaid balance 
of the sale price and finance and insurance costs, together 
with a Chattel l\iortgage on the autmnobile being sold 
to secure the Note, which would be forwarded to the 
bank and Fotheringhmn would issue a check in the name 
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of Winder Insurance Agency drawn on Sandy City Bank, 
payable to the purchaser and United Auto Sales, for the 
balance of the sale price of the car, which check would 
be delivered to United Auto Sales which, in turn, would 
furnish to Sandy City Bank the Certificate of Title to 
the automobile showing title in the name of the purchaser 
with Sandy City Bank as lienholder when the new title 
was issued. (Para. 3 Am. Cross-Complaint of Sandy City 
B.ank; R. 134-5; Stip. R. 101-4, 3.04-5, 313). 
At the commencement of this action Sandy City 
nan,•. Bank had three separate claims against the defendants 
~~~ (a) the Dalton transaction, (b) the Hardy transaction 
iW. and (c) the J. Ray Ward Mortgage transaction. 
~ 
~~ (a) THE DALTON TRANSACTION: As above 
:~ set forth Dalton agreed to purchase from United Auto 
!tti Sales a 1954 Chevrolet and paid $100.00 in cash. He 
trr~ executed his Promissory Note in favor of Sandy City 
i~l Bank for the sum of $1604.41 and gave his Chattel Mort-
~7 gage for that amount upon the Chevrolet which he was 
1m· purchasing (Exs. 11-D and 13-D). Fotheringham issued 
w~ a check on the account of Winder Insurance Agency 
1r payable to Eugene Dalton drawn on the Midvale Branch 
of Sandy City Bank for the sum of $1282.75, being the 
unpaid balance on the Chevrolet (Ex. 12-D), the differ-
ence between the amount of the check .and the amount of 
the Note being insurance charges and finance costs. The 
check was delivered to United Auto Sales and it collected 
the check on the forged endorsment of Eugene Dalton's 
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name (R. 142). On discovery of the forgery the account 
of Winder Insurance Agency, which had been charged 
with the check, was credited with the amount of the 
check and Sandy City Bank has not been reimbursed by 
United Auto Sales. Sandy City Bank has a Forgery 
Bond and has been reimbursed for the amount of said 
check by American Surety Company, (R. 311) which is 
entitled to subrogation for any amount which Sandy City 
Bank collects on the Dalton transaction. Sec. 31-5-15 
U.C.A. 1953. 
(b) THE HARDY TRAXSACTION: As above 
stated, in June 1954 R. E. Hardy agreed to purchase from 
United Auto Sales a 1954 Chevrolet. He traded in his 
::Mercury car and on June 29, 1954 executed to Sandy 
City Bank his Promissory Note in the sum of $1873.08 
secured by his Chattel 1fortgage on the new Chevrolet 
(Exs. 22-D and 23-D). On July 1, 1954 Fotheringham 
issued a check (Ex. 21-D) in the sun1 of $1650.00, being 
the balance owing United Auto Sales on the sale of the 
Chevrolet, which check was payable to Ralph E. Hardy 
and United Auto Sales. The check was delivered to 
United States Auto Sales which collected the proceeds 
thereof by depositing it in the account of United Auto 
Sales at the Pioneer Branch of \Yalker Bank & Trust 
C01npany without obtaining the endorsement of Ralph 
E. Hardy. \ Vhen defendants could not deliver title to 
the Chevrolet Hardy refused to endorse the check which 
had been paid b)· Sandy City Bank. Sandy City Bank 
could not charge the check against the account of Winder 
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Insurance Agency because of the lack of Hardy's en-
dorsement. Sandy City Bank has not been reimbursed 
o[ ~ for the amount of this check, viz: $1650.00. 
~00~ 
~ or~r: 
ol~~l 
fu~~ 
ly~~ 
Jl~~ 
(c) WARD TRANSACTION: Prior to June 24, 
1954 United Auto Sales was the owner of a 1954 Cadillac 
Coupe. It was badly in need of. money, so it took the 
Cadillac to the Salt Lake Auction and sold it for cash 
and used the proceeds to pay the unpaid balance on the 
Cadillac and other debts (R. 295). It still needed more 
money in order to obtain titles for cars that it had sold 
to deliver to the Bank (R. 343). To help raise the needed 
money .and relying on the manner in which loans were 
made by the Bank to United Auto Sales (R. 343) Ward 
and Selleneit arranged to double-finance the Cadillac 
through Sandy City Bank (R. 326, 334 and 343). Acting 
through Fotheringham of the Winder Insurance Agency, 
as was done in all other financial transactions by United 
Auto Sales with the Bank and knowing he could not 
deliver title (R. 326), because he had already sold the 
Cadillac, Ward executed his Promissory note to Sandy 
City Bank (Ex. 25-D) for the sum of $2962.08 .and to se-
cute it executed and delivered his Chattel Mortgage on 
said Cadillac which had already been sold, in favor of 
Sandy City Bank. The Note and the Mortgage were de-
livered to Fotheringham and forwarded to the Bank, 
and Fotheringham issued check of the Winder Insurance 
Agency, payable to J. Ray Ward and United Auto Sales, 
for the sum of $2500.00, which was cashed and collected. 
Title to the Cadillac had .already been transferred to Salt 
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Lake Auction and could not be supplied to the Bank, and 
the Bank has not been reimbursed for that $2500.00. 
On all of the clairns of plaintiff and third party 
plaintiffs, except Sandy City Bank, the Court made 
findings that the several transactions were fraudulent. 
In respect to Sandy City Bank's claims the Court refusecl 
to find they were fraudulent (R. 174:-177). 
On e.ach and all of the foregoing claims of Sandy 
City Bank the Court awarded judgment in favor of Sandy 
City Bank and against J. Ray Ward and Lewis Selleneit 
for the amounts claimed, but denied the Bank judgment 
against U. S. F. & G. Co. The result of the foregoing 
judgments is that the aggregate judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and third party plaintiffs against U. S. F. & G. 
Company on Selleneit's bond was the full amount of 
the bond, but on the "\V ard bond the total judgment 
amounted to only $3683.00 and interest, leaving a balance 
on the W.ard bond for which no judgn1ent was entered 
against the Bonding Con1pany in the approximate sum 
of $1300.00. 
STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MORT-
GAGING OF THE CADILLA!C WAS NOT IN THE COURSE 
OF BUSINESS OF WARD AS A USED CAR DEALER. 
R-164. THAT FINDING IS CONTRARY TO ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
TU SUPPORT IT. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
MORTGAGING OF THE CADILLAC WAS FRAUDULENT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPEL-
LANT JUDGMENT AGAINST 'THE U. S. F. & G. CO. ON ITS 
CLAIM AGAINST WARD FOR MORTGAGING THE CADIL-
LAC IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HAD SOLD IT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
COLLECTION BY UNITED S'TATES AUTO SALES OF THE 
HARDY CHECK WITHOUT OBTAINING HIS ENDORSE-
MENT THEREON AND WITHOUT DELIVERING TITLE TO 
THE CAR WAS FRAUDULENT. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPEL-
LANT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE U. S. F & G. CO. ON 
ITS ·CLAIM BASED ON THE HARDY CHECK. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
COLLECTION BY THE UNITED AUTO SALES OF THE 
DALTON CHECK ON A FORGED ENDORSEMENT AND 
WITHOUT DELIVERING TITLE TO THE CAR WAS 
FRAUDULENT. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPEL-
LANT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE U. S. F. & G. CO. ON ITS 
CLAIM BASED ON THE DALTON CHECK. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction Applying Equally to all Points. 
Appellant bases its right to recovery against the 
Bonding Company squarely on Licensing and Bonding 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act regulating auto-
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mobile dealers and automobile s.alesrnen, Title 41, Chap. 
3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Sec. 41-3-6 provides that 
it is unlawful to act as a vehicle dealer or salesman with-
out first obtaining a license from the 1Iotor Vehicle 
Dealer's Adrninistrator. Sec. 41-3-16 provides that be-
fore a 1Iotor Vehicle Dealer's License is issued the ap-
plicant shall file with the Administrator a bond in the 
sum of $5000.00 "conditioned that said applicant shall 
conduct his business as a dealer without fraud or fraudu-
lent representation, and without the violation of any of 
the provisions of this .act." Sec. 41-3-16 provides that 
before a 11otor Vehicle Salesman's License is issued the 
applicant shall file with the Adrninistrator a bond in the 
sum of $1000.00 "conditioned that the applicant shall per-
form his duties as an auton1obile salesman without fraud 
or fraudulent representation and without the violation 
of any of the provisions of this act." 
Sec. 41-3-18. Right of Action Dealer, Salesn1an or 
Surety on Bond. "If any person shall suffer any loss 
or damage by reason of fraud, fradulent representation 
or violation of any of the proYisions of this Act by a 
licensed dealer or one of his s.alesrnen, then acting for 
the dealer on his behalf, or within the scope of the enl-
ployrnent of such salesrnen, such person shall have a right 
of action against such dealer, andjor the auton1obile 
salesman guilty of the fraud, fraudulent representation 
or violation of any of the proYisions of this Act, .andjor 
the sureties upon their respediYe bonds." 
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Sec. -t 1-3-~ provides that "every person * * * upon 
the sale and delivery of any used or second-hand motor 
vehicle shall within 48 hours thereof deliver to the ven-
dee, and endorsed according to law, a certificate of title, 
issued for said vehicle by the State Tax Commission." 
All of the autOinobiles involved in this lawsuit, except 
the Currier Ford, were used cars, so that the sale of any 
of the cars by F nited Auto Sales, when it could not 
deliver title, was a violation of the Act which made the 
seller .and his bondsman liable, independent of actual 
fraud. 
The foregoing sections were before this court in the 
case of Bates v. Simpson, decided January 11, 1952 (239 
P. 2d. 749.) In that c.ase a bonded automobile dealer 
agreed to sell a car and took in a trade-in which he sold. 
When he could not arrange to finance the sale of the 
car he obtained the aid of another auto dealer in secur-
ing the finance. The de.aler who made the sale collected 
the proceeds of the financing and of the sale of the trade-
in and disappeared without applying the money on the 
purchase of the title to the car which he had sold. In 
that case judgment was awarded ag.ainst the defaulting 
automobile dealer and also against his statutory bonds-
man and in favor of both the purchaser of the car for 
the v.alue of his trade-in and the other dealer who was 
damaged to the extent of the amount financed on the 
car that was sold. 
Appellant has been unable to find judicial interpreta-
tions of the term "Fraud" as used in Motor Vehicle 
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Dealer's statute such as ours. It is submitted that the 
purpose of the statute was to protect persons dealing 
with automobile dealers and salesmen from dishonest 
conduct and to insure performance of their contracts, 
and that to accomplish that result the term "fraud" must 
be given a broad meaning. 
Black's Law .Dictionary, Third Edition, page 813 
defines "Fraud" as follows: 
"FRAUD. Fraud consists of some deceitful 
practice or willful device, resorted to wtih intent 
to deprive another of his right, or in some man-
ner to do him an injury. As distinguished from 
negligence it is always positive, intentional." Cit-
ing many cases. 
"Fraud, in the sense of a court of equity, 
properly includes all acts, omissions, and con-
cealments which involve a breach of legal or 
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed 
and are injurious to another, or by which an un-
due and unconscionious advantage is taken of 
another." Citing 1 Story Eq. Jur. Sec. 187 and 
other cases. 
The following illustrations of the broad meaning of 
the tern1 "Fraud" taken fron1 "\Yords and Phrases, Vol. 
17, Permanent Edition, pages 52-! et seq are submitted 
as applicable to this statute. 
"Whatever is dishonest is fraudulent in foro 
conscientiae, and is so treated in a court of equity. 
Fraud and dishonesty are synonymous tenns." Ex 
Parte Hollrnan, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19, 21 L.R.A. 
N.S. 242 at 252. 
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"Words 'Fraud' and 'Dishonesty' in fidelity 
bonds should be given broad significance, extend-
ing beyond criminal acts." Brandon v. Holman, 
41 F2 586. 
•· Fidelity bonds insuring against 'Fraud' and 
'Dishonesty' cover acts showing w.ant of integrity 
or breach of trust. Exeter Banking Co. v. Taylor, 
160 A (N.H.) 733. 
"Fraud and Dishonesty are synonymous 
terms. Whatever is dishonest is fraudulent in 
foro conscientiae. If one acts unjustly and un-
lawfully he acts fraudulently. An unjust man is 
a fraudulent man." Ex Party Drayton, 153 F. 
986. 
'The meaning of 'fraud' and 'dishonesty' ex-
tends beyond acts which would be criminal. They 
are to be given a broad significance and taken 
most strongly against the surety company." Fid. 
& Dep. Co. of Md. v. Bates, 72 F2160. 
"Words 'fraud' and 'dishonesty' as used in 
indemnity bonds are broadly interpreted to include 
any acts which show a want of integrity or breach 
of trust." Mtg. Corp. of N. J. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 115 A. 2d 43. 19 N.J. 30. 
"Generally 'fraud' constitutes any artifice 
whereby he who practices it gains or attempts to 
g.ain some undue advantage to himself or to work 
some wrong or do injury to another by means 
of a representation which he knows to be false or 
of an act which he knows would be against right 
or in violation of some positive duty." U.S. v. 
Proctor & Gamble Co., 49 Fed. Supp. 676. 
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" 'Bad Faith' and 'fraud' are synonymous. 
'Bad Faith' is defined as the opposite of 'good 
faith' generally implying or involving actual or 
constructive fraud or a design to mislead or de-
ceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfil some 
duty or contractual obligation, not performed by 
an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but 
by some interested or sinister motive." State v. 
Shipman, 163 S.E. 657, 202 N.C. 518. 
In reference to the liability of a licensed real estate 
broker and his bondsman, the annotator of A.L.R. 17 
A.L.R. 2d 1016 makes the following statement: 
"As to misrepresentation or wrongful conduct, 
there is considerable variance in the statutes in 
referring th.ereto. The term 'misrepresentation' 
is frequently used, as are the terms 'fraud,' 'de-
ceit,' and 'fraudulent conduct'; but some statutes 
employ 'fraudulent representation' or 'wrongful 
acts'; and some combine the terms. But regardless 
of the tern1inology employed, the courts experience 
little difficulty in construing the statutes to in-
clude any fraudulent or wrongful activity by the 
broker in the pursuit of his occupation, whether by 
acts of commission or of an omissive nature, such 
as a failure to deliver title to property agreed 
to be sold or concealing the existence of a lien." 
In the light of the foregoing let us examine in detail 
the three individual transactions constituting the claims 
of the Appellant: 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MORT-
GAGING OF THE CADILLAC BY WARD AFTER HE HAD 
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SOLD IT WAS NOT IN THE .COURSE OF HIS BUSINESS AS 
A USED CAR DEALER. 
There is not one single statement or intimation in 
the record that in securing the loan on the Cadillac Ward 
was dealing as a private individual, as distinguished from 
his business as a bonded automobile dealer under the 
name United Auto Sales. On the contrary all of the evi-
dence shows that the transaction was a deliberate scheme 
to double finance the Cadillac, relying on the business 
arrangement between the bank, the Winder Insurance 
Agency, and the dealer, and for the purpose of raising 
the badly needed finance for the business. 
We invite an analysis of the entire testimony of Sel-
leneit (R. 321) and of Ward (R. 343) in respect to this 
transaction. Selleneit testified that Ward was to raise 
$5,000 for financing the business, which he never did. 
(R. 333). Because of the lack of finance they had ex-
hausted their credit (R. 337). He explained to Ward how 
he could raise needed money by double financing the 
Cadillac (R. 325). Selleneit stated that he told Ward 
that because the bank would give him time on the Cadillac 
financing he could borrow on it and then sell it and re-
ceive the cash on it and use the cash to buy other automo-
biles, and then pay the bank later (R. 334). 
Ward, in explaining the Cadillac transaction stated 
(R. 343) that they needed money to pay for the title on 
the Cadillac, and to pay for titles on other cars, and 
upon Selleneit's advise he sold the Cadillac at the Salt 
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Lake Auction, and then mortgaged it to Sandy City Bank 
for $2,500. Ward also testified that this could be accom-
plished because the Sandy City Bank in dealing with 
United Auto Sales did not require immediate delivery 
of titles. Ward further stated that Selleneit called the 
bank and arranged for the loan (R. 347); and that Ward 
.and Selleneit went to the vVinder Insurace Agency where 
the note and nwrtgage were made out. The check issued 
by the Winder Insurance Agency (Ex. 24-D) was payable 
to the United Auto Sales and to J. Ray Ward, and was 
endorsed and deposited in his bank account. He said it 
was deposited the same as the Hardy check (Ex. 21-D) 
which was in the United Auto Sales account at Pioneer 
Branch of \V alker Bank & Trust Co. 
We submit that this transaction was handled in ex-
actly the same manner as were all of the other transac-
tions of the United Auto Sales; that is, through the ar-
rangement which ~Ir. Fotheringhan1 had set up by which 
the bank would agree to finance sales by the United Auto 
Sales, a bonded dealer, and upon the receipt of a note and 
mortgage, would eredit the account of \Yinder Insurance 
Agency and \\'Ould honor its check to pay for the car, 
relying on the United Auto Sales as a bonded dealer to 
deliver title in due course. There is absolutely no evi-
dence to the contrary, and so we submit that the court 
erred in finding that this transaction was not in the 
course of business of the Fnited .Auto Sales. In order for 
this transaction to have been a priY.ate deal by Ward, in 
view of the way he had been transacting his business with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
"Vinder Insurance Agency and the Bank it would have 
been necessary for him to go personally to the bank and 
arrange for a lo.an to himself individually, in which event 
the bank would have required him to furnish a title to the 
Cadillac, as was its practice in all other cases where it 
was not dealing with a bonded dealer. 
POINTS 2 AND 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
TRANSACTION BY WHICH WARD SOLD THE CADILLA·C, 
AND THEN MORTGAGED IT TO THE BANK FOR $2500, 
WAS FRAUDULENT, AND IN FAILING TO AWARD THE 
BANK JUDGMENT AGAINST THE BONDING COMPANY 
ON THIS TRANSACTION. 
That this trans.action was a planned fraud on the 
bank is too patent to require argument. Ward and Selle-
neit admit, and their attorneys stipulate in the record, 
that after deliberation, Ward sold the Cadillac at the Salt 
Lake Auto Auction and collected the proceeds of the sale. 
Then on July 9, 1954, a few days after that sale, and 
knowing that the bank relied on the United Auto S.ales 
to deliver a title later, Ward borrowed from the bank 
$2500 on his note secured by a mortgage on this same 
Cadillac. In the mortgage he expressly represented that 
he was the owner of the Cadillac free from any lien and 
encumbr.ance, when in fact he had personally sold the 
Cadillac and had transferred title to someone else. His 
only justification for this transaction is that he hoped 
to pay the debt from the proceeds of future auto sales. 
Of course the record shows that the business failed and 
this indebtedness has not been paid. 
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By the terms of the bond of the U. S. F. & G. and of 
the statute any person damaged by the fraud of the bond-
ed dealer is entitled to recover for that damage against 
the dealer and the bonding company. \Ve submit that 
this transaction is a deliberate fraud by the bonded dealer 
and that the bonding company is liable to the bank, and 
that it was error for the court to fail to award to the bank 
judgment against the bonding company. 
POINTS 4 AND 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
COLLECTION BY THE UNTTED AUTO SALES OF THE 
HARDY CHECK WITHOUT OBTAINING HIS ENDORSE-
MENT THEREON, AND WITHOUT DELIVERING TITLE TO 
THE CAR, WAS FRAUDULENT, AND THAT THE COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD APPELLANT JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE U. S. F. & G. ·CO. ON ITS CLAIM ON THE 
HARDY CHECK. 
As set forth in the Statement of Fact at page 5, 
on June 26, 1945 United Auto Sales .agreed to sell to 
Hardy a Chevrolet automobile. He traded in a :Mercury 
automobile as the down pay1nent, leaving an unpaid bal-
ance of the purchase price of the Chevrolet, including 
insurance and finance costs of $1873.00. In line with th~ 
practice of financing this balance and acting through 
Winder Insur.ance Agency he executed a Pron1issory Note 
in favor of the Bank for that balance, which was secured 
by his Chattel .Jlortgage on the Chevrolet whirh he was 
purchasing, 'vhich Note and 1fortgage were delivered to 
the Bank. The "\Yinder Insurance Agenry thereupon is-
sued its check in the su1n of $1650.00, being the balance 
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owing United Auto Sales on the sales price of the Chev-
rolet, drawn on Sandy City Bank and payable to R. E. 
Hardy, the purchaser, and United Auto Sales. United 
Auto Sales endorsed this check, but without obtaining the 
endorsement of R. E. Hardy it deposited the check in its 
account at the Pioneer Branch of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company which, in turn, placed its endorsement of "All 
prior endorsements guaranteed" on the check and for-
warded it through the Salt Lake Clearing House to Sandy 
City Bank, which paid it. When United Auto Sales could 
not deliver the title to the Chevrolet Hardy refused to 
endorse the check .and, of course, the Bank was required 
to credit the account of Winder Insurance Agency because 
of the lack of endorsement. The Bank has not been reim-
bursed for the $1650.00 which United Auto Sales collected 
without the endorsement of Hardy and without furnishing 
title to the automobile involved. 
In this matter we submit that the cashing of this 
check without the endorsement of Hardy by United Auto 
Sales, knowing that it could not deliver title to the car, 
was a fraud. By depositing and collecting the check 
United Auto Sales represented that it was the owner of 
the check and entitled to the proceeds. In fact this money 
was borrowed from the Bank by Hardy and it belonged 
to him until he chose to apply it on the purchase price of 
the automobile, which of course he was obligated to do 
by reason of his Mortgage. It did not belong to United 
Auto Sales until Hardy released it by his endorsement 
and until United Auto Sales could deliver title to the 
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Chevrolet. Of course had Hardy endorsed the check and 
released the money the Bank would have recourse against 
Hardy, and in that event Hardy obviously would have 
recourse for failure to deliver title against United Auto 
Sales and against the U. S. F. & G. Co. on the bond. By the 
same token we submit the Bank, which relies on the dealer 
to supply title, is entitled to judgment against the Bond-
ing Company where it collects from the Bank the sale 
price of the automobile ·but cannot deliver title. Further-
more, we submit that it was a fraud within the meaning 
of our Statute and of the bond for the United Auto Sales 
to collect the Hardy check without Hardy's endorsement. 
Because of the foregoing we submit that the Court 
should have found that the collection of the Hardy cheek 
by United Auto Sales was fraudulent and that it should 
have awarded judgment in favor of Sandy City Bank 
against the Bonding Company on this transaction. Of 
course Walker Bank & Trust Company was made a party 
to this action because of this check. Sandy City Bank 
claims that Walker Bank & Trust Company is li.able to 
it because it collected the check without a necessary en-
dorsement, but that is a matter for independent deter-
mination. If Sandy City Bank succeeds in collecting 
from Walker Bank & Trust C01npany, \V alker Bank & 
Trust Company is subrogated to whatever Sandy City 
Bank realizes in this action on the Hardy transaction 
(R. 352). 
POINTS 6 AND 7 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAIUNG TO FIND THAT THE 
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COLLECTION BY UNITED AUTO SALES OF THE DALTON 
CHE>CK ON THE FORGED ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAME 
OF DALTON AND WITHOUT DELIVERING TITLE TO THE 
CAR WAS FRAUDULENT, AND THAT IT LIKEWISE ERRED 
IN FAILING TO AWARD APPELLANT JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE U. S. F. & G. CO. ON ITS CLAIM BASED~ ON 
THE DALTON CHECK. 
As set forth in the Statement of Fact, p. 4, Dalton 
agreed to purchase a Chevrolet automobile from United 
Auto Sales and 1nade a $100.00 cash down payment. lie 
executed his Promissory Note for the sum of $1604.41, 
being the unpaid balance on the automobile plus insur-
ance and finance charges, and executed his Chattel Mort-
g.age on the Chevrolet automobile to secure payment of 
that amount, which Note and Mortgage were forwarded 
to the Bank, whereupon the Winder Insurance Agency 
issued its check drawn on Sandy City Bank for the sum 
of $1282.75 payable to Eugene Dalton and United Auto 
Sales. 1\Ir. Ward testified that that check was delivered 
to United Auto Sales and that he endorsed United Auto 
Sales on the check and handed it to Mr. Selleneit. At that 
time there was no endorsement of the check by Eugene 
Dalton. By arrangement with Mr. vV ard and for the 
purpose of obtaining funds with which to p.ay a pressing 
obligation owing to an auction company in Wyoming (R. 
331). _Mr. Selleneit, according to Ward's testimony (R. 
344), presented the Dalton check, then endorsed with the 
name Eugene Dalton, which endorsement was a forgery, 
to Sandy City Bank and obtained cashier's check there-
for. Although 1\Jr. Selleneit denied forging the endorse-
ment of Eugene Dalton the record indicates he was the 
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only one who had possession of the check between the time 
it was delivered to him and the time it was cashed, and 
inasmuch as Selleneit testified that it was his practice to 
endorse, if necessary, the names of purchaser payees 
on checks, it is reasonable to assume that he forged the 
name of Eugene Dalton on this check. In any event 
United Auto Sales collected on the Dalton transaction the 
sum of $1282.75 on the forged endorsement of the name 
Eugene Dalton, and failed at all times to deliver title to 
the automobile which it had sold. 
We submit that the collection of the proceeds of the 
sale of the automobile where it could not deliver title was 
a violation of the Statute which requires the delivery of 
title, which makes the Bonding Company liable to anyone 
who is damaged by the failure to deliver title, and fur-
thermore, that the obtaining of this money by United 
Auto Sales on the forged endorsement of the name Eu-
gene Dalton was a fraud within the provisions of the 
Statute and the provisions of the Bond, and that the 
Bonding Company is liable to the Bank because of that 
fraud. 
It was intimated at the trial that because Sandy 
City Bank had forgery insurance and the American Sure-
ty Company, on that insurance, had paid to Sandy City 
Bank the mnount of this cheek, the Bank was not entitled 
to recover. Sandy City Bank recognizes that American 
Surety Company is entitled to be subrogated for any 
a1nount which Sandy City Bank collects in this action on 
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account of the Dalton transaction. Clearly the American 
Surety Company can have its rights protected in thi~ 
action in the name of Sandy City Bank under the provi-
sions of Sec. 31-5-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provides "each insurer shall conduct its business in its 
own legal name, except that in subrogation actions it 
may sue in the name of its assured." 
We submit that had United Auto Sales obtained 
the signature of Dalton on the check issued to him he 
would have then been liable to Sandy City Bank for the 
proceeds of the check and he, in turn, would have had a 
claim against United Auto Sales for the breach of the 
delivery of title. Inasmuch as Dalton did not release the 
funds represented by the Mortgage he does not continue 
liable to the Bank on such Mortgage, but when United 
Auto Sales collected the proceeds of that loan by a forged 
endorsement of the name Eugene Dalton, they wrong-
fully and unlawfully collected the sale price of the car 
to which they were not entitled, and inasmuch as Sandy 
City Bank has not been reimbursed by United Auto Sales 
the Bonding Company is and should be liable to the 
Bank. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. A. SMITH 
.Attorney for Appellant 
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